The extractive industries and development:The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels by Gilberthorpe, Emma & Papyrakis, Elissaios
  
1 
 
  
The Extractive Industries and Development: 
The Resource Curse at the Micro, Meso and Macro Levels 
 
 
 
                                                         Abstract 
The resource curse literature has necessarily evolved in a rather fragmented way. 
While economists, political economists and political scientists have largely focused 
on the role of mineral abundance in long-term growth with the analysis largely 
confined to the country (macro) or regional (meso) level, anthropologists, 
sociologists and other social scientists have explored the development impacts of 
extractive industries at the community (micro) level. While this has provided a 
rigorous and comprehensive exploration of extractive industries and their impacts, 
causal factors that bridge and/or leap-frog these levels tend not to be accounted for. 
In this paper we examine the evolution of literature across disciplinary lines and 
different levels of scale to assess the current status of resource curse debates. In so 
doing, we aim to explore how an integration of the various multi-scale approaches 
can help address the persistent problem of the resource curse.   
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
The interest of the scientific community in the ‘resource curse’ (i.e. the tendency 
of mineral rich economies to underperform in economic growth and other development 
outcomes) has critically evolved over the last two decades. A Google Scholar search 
shows that while there were only 13 scientific papers that referred to the so-called 
‘resource curse’ in 1995, the number increased to 67 in 2000, 543 in 2005, 1,890 in 
2010 and 2,420 in 2014.  This level of academic focus combined with greater awareness 
through media reporting, civil action and improved outlets for dispute by indigenous 
populations and social movements, has led to better monitoring and regulation at the 
global level. Voluntary initiatives, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) and the Global Mining Initiative, are just two of many examples that 
indicate how scientific research has influenced policy circles; yet, after 20 years of 
research and action, ‘the curse’ lingers as a very real global problem.  
Identification within academic circles that something was drastically wrong 
with mineral-based development1 followed the influential World Bank-funded study 
conducted by Alan Gelb and his Associates (1988). The term ‘resource curse’ was itself 
first coined by Professor Richard Auty in 1993 in his seminal book, Sustaining 
Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (Auty, 1993). The 
response to these major studies saw a natural evolution of research on the extractive 
industries within economic and political spheres. In other disciplines a focus on the 
‘resource curse’, which is, by definition and application, an economic theory and tool, 
was far slower and is, as a result, far smaller. Economic theory does not always translate 
well to other social sciences.  Application of ‘the resource curse’ to understand complex 
and diverse localized social, political and economic conditions, as well as nuanced 
factors such as local accounts of the impacts of extractive industries, diverse processes 
of extraction, and the nature of the mineral itself have been found to be severely limiting 
in the social sciences (see especially Weszkalnys, 2011; also Lahiri-Dutt, 2006; Reyna 
and Behrends, 2008). For more micro-level scientific researchers, the ‘resource curse’ 
was a macro-level problem, and the impacts of extractive industries  at the 
                                                 
1 Mineral economies are defined as developing countries that generate ‘at least 8% of their GDP and 
40% of their export earnings from the mineral sector’ (Auty, 1993: 3). They make up approximately 
one-fifth of developing countries (Auty and Mikesell, 1999). 
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local/village/community level were, and are, examined in terms of social change and 
problems linked to processes of sustainable development.   
Consequently, the multidisciplinary concern with the impact of extractives 
rarely translates into interdisciplinary research (for exceptions see Bebbington et al., 
2008; Bebbington, 2010; Bebbington and Bebbington, 2011; Bebbington and Bury, 
2009 and Berdeguéa et al., 2015 -  these are some of the few attempts to provide a more 
holistic picture of the resource curse by looking at the community-extractive industries-
government nexuses at different scales, particularly in the Latin American context). 
There are many reasons for this, but methodological diversity is key. Disciplines work 
in very different ways. Taking the two disciplinary extremes examined in this paper as 
an example, while an economist identifies a question and seeks to answer it, an 
anthropologist pursues questions to find meaning rather than provide answers. When a 
concern for the economic implications of ‘the curse’ emerged within policy circles in 
the 1980s, economists and political economists were the obvious choice for aiding 
policy development because their disciplinary methods provide quantitative data that 
can be understood and linked to clear action points. A broad examination of the vast 
literature on the resource curse, however, shows that while the mainstream economics 
and political economics literature (the micro, and the meso) provides invaluable insight 
into extractive industries, the micro level analyses that have followed provide a nuanced 
examination of its effects that is equally valuable. Combined, they can provide a much 
more comprehensive view of extractive industries and its impacts as fabricated at the 
global and the local level. 
Our aim in this paper is to examine the ways in which different disciplinary 
focuses have shaped the resource curse literature. Moreover, we aim to examine 
disciplinary boundaries and the fragmentation of the resource curse debates across 
different levels of scale. The objective here is to show how these levels and the different 
disciplines that inhabit them, are critical to understanding the factors determining the 
resource curse for future policy development. As such, this paper is first and foremost 
a review of the resource literature. It also, however, identifies important linkages 
between an apparently disparate literature that could have a very real impact on 
defeating ‘the curse’. This paper contributes to the literature by providing a first attempt 
at bridging the different fragments of research on the resource curse, which have been 
largely determined across disciplinary lines and across different levels of scale. To our 
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knowledge this is the first dedicated endeavour to provide such a holistic framework 
under which the resource curse phenomenon should be analysed.  
In Section 2 of the paper we discuss in more detail how the different streams of 
the resource curse literature have evolved separately. In particular, we pay special 
attention to the qualitatively different types of findings across these fragments of the 
resource curse literature. In Sections 3 to 7, we reflect on the implications of this 
fragmentation for the scientific analysis on development impacts in mineral rich 
countries, as well as for appropriate policy-making at various scales. 
 
2. THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE RESOURCE CURSE LITERATURE  
In this section we elaborate further on the fragmentation of the resource curse literature 
with respect to scale, as well as methodology and policy focus. Although there are 
naturally no strict demarcation lines, we try to establish some general patterns based on 
our observation of the divergent approaches that have been adopted so far. First we 
discuss the fragmentation of the literature with respect to the geographic level of 
analysis (macro-country level, meso-subnational level, micro-community level), as 
well as the types of impacts and mechanisms considered (e.g. economic, institutional, 
etc.). Then we proceed to discuss fragmentation along other lines, such as the type of 
methodological approach and the link to different policy questions over time vis-à-vis 
the mineral sector. 
 The discussion that follows has greatly benefited from earlier review articles on 
the resource curse that have summarised theories and empirical evidence linking the 
extractive industries (and natural resources more broadly) with several development 
outcomes. One of the earliest reviews of the literature (focusing primarily on political 
economy explanations of the resource curse) is the one conducted by Ross (1999). Two 
other early review papers by Gylfason (2001b) and Stevens (2003) primarily focused 
on the economic explanations of the curse. A subsequent review by Andrew Rosser 
(2009) critically reflected on the resource curse literature by devoting a separate 
discussion to the causes, consequences and remedies of the curse. Jeffrey Frankel 
(2010) provided a more comprehensive review of the economics literature on the 
resource curse, paying particular attention to the robustness of the empirical evidence. 
Ross (2014) recently provided a detailed overview of the literature on institutional 
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explanations (theory and evidence) of the resource curse. The discussion that follows 
has built on the insights presented in these earlier review papers with an explicit intent 
to reflect on the fragmentation of the literature along several lines (scale and 
disciplinary and methodological approaches). Furthermore, the earlier review papers 
have paid only marginal attention to the more micro-scale studies on the impacts of the 
extractive industries on local communities. Our intention has been to fill this gap and 
provide a more holistic picture of the different fragments of the resource curse 
literature. 
 
3. THE MACRO SCALE  
Economists and other social scientists (e.g. political scientists, political 
economy scholars, institutional sociologists, geographers, etc.) have extensively probed 
into the macro-level impacts of mineral resources. Below we discuss the main streams 
of this macro-level research depending on the types of impacts and mechanisms 
considered (e.g. economic, institutional etc.). 
 
3.1 The Macro Scale (Macroeconomics) 
 Economists have largely examined the role of mineral resources in influencing 
economic factors that can impact on long-term economic development. Some earlier 
development economists in the 50s and 60s (e.g. see the writings by Lewis, 1955; Innis, 
1963; Rostow, 1960; Watkins, 1963) suggested that resource endowments could 
potentially alleviate credit constraints and result in economic expansion. In effect, at 
the time there was more anticipation of a resource blessing rather than a curse in terms 
of expected macroeconomic impacts – higher transportation costs made mineral 
availability seen as a prerequisite of successful industrial expansion and improvement 
in living standards. The majority of economic scholars, though, pointed to a causality 
of a different direction. Some economists contested the existence of positive spillovers 
from mineral extraction to the rest of the economy, suggesting that these are likely to 
be very localised, particularly in the presence of foreign multinationals (Hirschman, 
1958; Baldwin, 1966; for some more recent evidence and discussion see Veltmeyer, 
2013). Raul Prebisch (1950) and Hans Singer (1950) suggested that the terms of trade 
of resource-dependent economies deteriorate over time (i.e. the relative price of primary 
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commodities vs. manufactured goods falls) which aggravates the income gap between 
the resource rich developing countries and the rest of the world (although the trend has 
been reversed in recent years as a result of the mineral commodities boom; see also the 
paper by Harvey et al., 2010 that provides evidence in support of the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis over a period of four centuries). As a consequence of these adverse terms of 
trade, mineral rich nations would need to export an increasingly larger amount of 
natural resources for any given level of imported manufactured commodities.  
The Dutch Disease theory and its variants subsequently provided a more 
sophisticated framework to examine the macroeconomic effects of mineral abundance 
on trade patterns, and thereof on economic growth. In their basic Dutch Disease model, 
Corden and Neary (1982) separate the Dutch Disease mechanism into two effects (see 
also Corden, 1984). The first, called the Resource Movement Effect describes the shift 
of production factors (capital; labour) from manufacturing and other productive 
activities towards the primary sector as a result of changes in relative marginal 
productivities. In the case of labour shifts, this might be less of a concern for developing 
countries characterised by large labour surpluses (although skilled labour might be in 
shortage; see Ross, 2001 for a discussion). The second, called the Spending Effect, 
concentrates on the inflationary pressures induced as a result of the positive income 
shock (triggered by the increase in mineral wealth) that decreases the competitiveness 
of commodities outside the primary sector. Both effects result in a structural 
transformation that disadvantages the non-primary tradable sectors. Much of the 
literature has focused on the potential contraction of the manufacturing sector and 
subsequent repercussions for economic growth, as a result of the stronger learning-by-
doing externalities of the sector (Aizenman and Lee, 2010; Krugman, 1987; 
Matsuyama, 1992; Papyrakis, 2011). The overall impact of a Dutch Disease on 
economic growth will depend on the relative learning-by-doing and spillover effects 
across sectors (see Torvik, 2001). Several country studies have provided support to the 
Dutch Disease hypothesis (Papyrakis and Raveh, 2014 for Canada; Auty and Evia, 2001 
for Bolivia, Mikesell, 1997 for Venezuela and Peru; Pegg, 2010 for Botswana; Kutan 
and Wyzan, 2005 and Egert and Leonard, 2008 for Kazakhstan). 
There are several other macro-scale resource curse theories that focus on 
economic variables. For example, it has been shown that mineral resource abundance 
is associated with reduced savings and investment rates, given that capital accumulation 
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becomes less important for sustaining future income levels (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 
2006). Gylfason and Zoega (2006) also provide evidence of a negative link between 
resource dependence and the rate of national savings in GDP as well as the maturity of 
the financial system (hampering hence a more efficient allocation of capital across 
sectors and firms). Any accumulated savings should also be channelled into the 
domestic economy to the extent that there is shortage of physical capital and the 
economy is far below its full employment level (Venables, 2010). The macro resource 
curse may also be related to a debt overhang, with mineral rich states using their 
reserves as collateral for debt in international markets (see Manzano and Rigobon, 
2001; Sarr et al., 2011). Usui’s (1997) case study on two oil-rich countries (Indonesia 
and Mexico) provides evidence on how such “boom-based borrowing” often results in 
debt crises (in 1975 and 1982 in Indonesia and Mexico respectively). The volatile 
swings of world resource prices are also likely to result in a macroeconomic see-saw 
effect for mineral rich economies, as well as create uncertainty for domestic and foreign 
investors (see van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010). It also makes it difficult for 
governments to impose fiscal discipline (due to the volatility in government revenues; 
see Auty, 1998). The direction of causality can go both ways and a prudent fiscal policy 
itself is an important shielding mechanism against the degree of exposure of the 
domestic economy to an external resource price shock (Pieschacón, 2012). The 
volatility effect is also likely to be further accentuated by the lack of diversification in 
the economy, both as a result of the aforementioned Dutch Disease effect, as well as a 
lack of far-sighted industrial competitive policies (see Auty, 1994; Auty and Pontara, 
2008; Murshed and Serino, 2011). The poor record of mineral-rich economies in terms 
of diversifying economic activities and limiting overreliance on primary exports was 
already well documented since the late 70s (Eden, 1979; Kubursi, 1984) – this tendency 
largely persists today with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Tunisia, Chile, United Arab 
Emirates; for a discussion see Farooki and Kaplinky, 2014; Gelb, 2010; Wiig and 
Kolstad, 2012). 
Economists have largely focused on the aforementioned mechanisms in order 
to explain the negative observed correlation between mineral resources and long-term 
economic growth (normally over a period of 3-4 decades). There have been several 
growth econometrics (cross-country) studies that have explored the links between 
minerals and improvements in GDP per capita over time (e.g. Brunnschweiler, 2008; 
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Murshed and Serino, 2011; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; 
Sachs and Warner, 2005; Williams, 2011). Some other cross-country econometric 
studies linked mineral resources with the observed variation in income (GDP per capita) 
levels rather than growth patterns (Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2008, 2011; Carmignani 
and Chowdhury, 2012). A few papers have also focused on broader human 
development indicators as the dependent variable of their econometric analysis. For 
example, Bulte et al. (2005) concentrate on the negative correlation between mineral 
resource abundance and the Human Development Index (HDI) – in the same study, the 
authors also examine how populations in mineral rich states suffer proportionately more 
from limited access to safe water and undernourishment. Some environmental 
economists have also linked mineral wealth to low scores of sustainable development 
indicators (such as the genuine savings and genuine income measurements that 
calculate net savings and income taking into account the rate of mineral depletion; see 
Atkinson, 2003; Dietz et al., 2007; Neumayer, 2004). It is important to note that the 
observed negative correlation between these aforementioned human 
development/welfare indicators and resource abundance holds even when one controls 
for the level of economic development (in other words, results are not driven by the 
GDP per capital level of mineral-rich economies). 
 
3.2 The Macro Scale (Political Economy/Institutional Analysis) 
A large segment of the macro-level resource curse literature (where other social 
scientists, e.g. political scientists and institutional sociologists, have been particularly 
active) primarily focuses on the relationship between extractive industries and non-
economic variables. This literature has largely looked at how mineral resources 
influence or interact with institutional dimensions (e.g. government efficiency, rule of 
law, corruption), democracy and conflict. Below we discuss the different branches 
belonging to this literature, although one needs to acknowledge that often these 
different streams overlap to some extent.    
 
3.2.1 Institutions (as dependent variable) 
Over the last decade, much attention has been drawn to the so-called 
institutional explanations of the resource curse. Several papers suggest that mineral 
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resources hamper the development of a good institutional framework, e.g. by breeding 
corruption and rent-seeking (Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Bulte et al., 2005; Isham et 
al., 2005; Leite and Weidman, 2002; Torvik, 2002). Several papers have associated 
mineral resources with rent-seeking by focusing on the role of (mineral-rent distorted) 
incentives. Mineral-induced rent-seeking often involves allocating resources (effort, 
funds etc.) on political lobbying to increase one's share of existing wealth without 
creating any added value to the economy (the term ‘rent-seeking’ was coined by Anne 
Kruger, 1974). Mineral wealth is often contested by numerous firms of individuals who 
are likely to exert their influence so that they can receive a larger share of the ‘prize’. 
For example, mining companies may pay bribes to governments to receive access to 
sites and individuals may attempt to influence governments (e.g. by means of striking, 
selective voting etc.) to redistribute a larger share of public revenues accruing from 
mining. A resource boom increases the incentive to lobby/rent-seek and hence diverts 
attention and resources from productive activities (e.g. see the papers by Baland and 
Francois, 2000; Boschini et al., 2007 Lane and Tornell, 1999; Torvik, 2002). Politicians 
may themselves willingly redistribute mineral rents in the form of direct transfers, 
subsidies or public goods in exchange for electoral support (see Robinson and Torvik, 
2005; Vergne, 2009). Of course the extent of rent-seeking depends on other opportunity 
costs in the economy (e.g. the return from other economic activities) and the 
appropriability of the mineral rents (e.g. their geographic concentration, number of 
contestants, etc.; see Wick and Bulte, 2006; Dejardin, 2011). 
Politicians can of course also rent-seek, manipulate institutions and distort 
policies, so that they gain direct access to the rents (Orogun, 2010; Ross, 2001). 
Overreliance on mineral revenues can limit good governance; public revenues become 
inefficiently allocated (based on rent-seeking rather than expected returns) often with 
lower-quality politicians in public office (Brollo et al., 2013), governments adopt short-
sighted policies given the volatility of prices and revenues and there are limited controls 
that encourage transparency and rule of law, limit expropriation and guarantee an 
efficient bureaucracy (Karl, 1997; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Stevens and Dietsche, 
2008). There have been several empirical cross-country analyses (using regression 
analysis) demonstrating a strong negative correlation between mineral resources and 
several institutional variables (e.g. for corruption, see Arezki and Brückner, 2011; Leite 
and Weidmann, 2002, for rule of law, see Kolstad, 2009; Norman, 2009; Sala-i-Martin 
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and Subramanian, 2012; for quality of bureaucracy, see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 
2008, Isham et al., 2005; for property rights protection see Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; 
Brunnschweiler, 2008, for transparency see Williams, 2011). 
 
3.2.2 Institutions (as mediating variable) 
The second body of literature on institutions and the resource curse does not 
treat institutions as an endogenous variable that is dependent on the abundance of 
mineral rents. Rather than trying to explain any variability in institutions as a result of 
mineral abundance, it instead emphasises the mediating role of good institutions in 
preventing the resource curse (Boschini et al., 2007; Kolstad, 2009; Mehlum et al., 
2006b; Sarmidi et al., 2014). The preventive role of good institutions against rent-
seeking is, for example, discussed by Tornell and Lane (1999), who show how weak 
institutions interacting with a mineral boom can induce a ‘voracity effect’ with 
numerous interest groups competing for the rents (see also Boschini et al., 2007 who 
link the appropriability of mineral rents, and hence the incentive to rent-seek, on 
institutional quality proxied by the extent of property rights protection). Mehlum et al. 
(2006b) also develop theoretical and empirical models to show how ‘grabber-friendly’ 
institutions that encourage corruption constrain growth in a mineral-rich environment. 
El Anshasy and Katsaiti (2013) find that low corruption and better governance improve 
windfall management leading to higher growth rates. The core message of the papers 
belonging to this substream of the resource curse literature is that sound institutions 
(e.g. secure property rights, efficient bureaucracies, low corruption) can turn the 
‘resource curse’ into a ‘resource blessing’. A good institutional framework can 
naturally benefit the country at multiple levels; e.g. from the very macro level in terms 
of channelling resource rents into productive growth-promoting investments and 
shielding against macroeconomic instability (e.g. Dutch Disease effects) to the very 
micro level by encouraging public expenditure management systems that ensure an 
equitable distribution of mineral rents, compensation of negatively affected 
communities and an improvements of local livelihoods. 
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3.2.3 Democracy 
Several papers have concentrated their attention on a particular institutional 
dimension; i.e. the tendency of mineral rents (and oil in particular) to hinder a transition 
to democracy. Cross-country statistical analysis has verified the link between mineral 
resources and limited government democratic accountability (Andersen and Ross, 
2015; Aslaksen, 2010; Ross, 2001; Tsui, 2011). Mineral rents are often misused by 
authoritarian rulers for the purpose of prolonging their stay in power (see Andersen and 
Aslaksen, 2013; Cuaresma et al., 2010). For example, authoritarian regimes in mineral-
rich states can rely much more on mineral rents than tax revenues, which 
correspondingly reduces public demand for democratic accountability (McFerson, 
2010; Ross, 2001, 2009; see also the book by Jill Crystal (1990) on oil politics in 
Kuwait and Qatar). Spending on patronage fuelled by the abundance of mineral rents 
may have a similar effect (Auty, 2005; Vandewalle, 1998). Mineral rents concentrated 
in the hands of authoritarian rulers may also suppress democratic aspirations either in 
the form of excessive spending in internal security (this is what Michael Ross (2001) 
coins the ‘repression effect’; see also Sandbakken, 2006; Tsui, 2010 and Gause, 1995) 
or obstruction of free information (Dutta and Roy, 2009; Egorov et al., 2009; Williams, 
2011). The appropriability of the mineral rents by the rulers in power (which for 
example might increase when mineral industries are nationalised) naturally mediates 
the resource-democracy relationship (Ross, 2012; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005). There 
is also evidence suggesting that it is the extent of mineral wealth that matters for 
democratic accountability rather than any shorter term changes in mineral affluence 
(e.g. a short-term income windfall induced by price fluctuations; see Haber and 
Menaldo, 2010; Wacziarg, 2012; Wright et al., 2015 and Andersen and Ross, 2015).  
Some studies have also treated democracy as a mediating (rather than dependent) 
variable upon which the materialisation of resource curse phenomena depends. For 
example, Arezki and Brückner (2010, 2012) find that mineral price booms lead to 
excessive government spending and sovereign bond spreads (a measure of 
macroeconomic uncertainty) in the presence of autocratic rulers. 
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3.2.4 Conflict 
Another important branch of the resource curse literature has linked the 
presence of mineral resources with violent conflict. Several papers have verified a 
positive relationship between mineral resources and the onset of civil war (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005; Dixon, 2009; Dunning, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Regan, 2003; Ross, 
2006; Welsch, 2008). Some of them have looked at particular types of resources; e.g. 
see Le Billon (2008), Lujala et al. (2005), Olsson (2006, 2007) and Ross (2006) for 
alluvial diamonds and Lujala et al. (2007) and Lujala (2010) for oil. The effect is also 
non-monotonic; while initial increases in mineral resources raises the probability of 
violent conflict, the latter falls for sufficiently high levels of mineral wealth (possibly 
via an income stabilising effect; see Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Collier et al., 2009) 
Several studies suggest that the effect of mineral resources on conflict is 
conditional on a range of variables. For example, the location of the resource. Onshore 
oil is more conducive to civil conflict (Lujala, 2010), as is oil extraction in regions with 
much lower income per capita than the national average (Østby et al., 2009). Countries 
that are more ethnically homogenous are more likely to avoid conflict in the presence 
of mineral resources (Bjorvatn and Naghavi, 2011; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; 
Esteban et al., 2012; Herbst, 2000; Hodler, 2006). The presence of mineral resources is 
not only associated with the onset of conflict but also with its duration (Ballantine, 
2003; Buhaug et al., 2009; Lujala et al., 2005, as well as Fearon, 2004 for the case of 
secessionist wars) and severity (e.g. extent of casualties per initial population). 
 
3.3 Other variables 
 
Finally, some of the macro resource curse literature focuses on how mineral 
resources influence some non-economic and non-institutional variables. Educational 
measures (such as the share of public expenditure in GDP or school enrolment rates) 
have been found to correlate negatively with proxies of mineral abundance (Gylfason, 
2001a relates this to the fact that extractive industries are often less human capital 
intensive; see also Birdall et al., 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Shao and Yang, 
2014). Ross (2007) finds that oil dependence correlates with gender inequality (in the 
domain of labour force participation and political representation), while Daniele (2011) 
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and de Soysa and Gizelis (2013) claim that mineral rich countries underperform in 
health indicators (e.g. proxied by child mortality and HIV infection rates). 
 
4. THE MESO SCALE 
In the last decade the scale of the resource curse analysis has also been lowered 
to an intermediate level, looking at differences between mineral-rich and mineral-poor 
regions within sovereign countries. This meso-scale resource curse literature examines 
whether some of the aforementioned resource curse mechanisms found across countries 
may also hold at the regional level. This nascent literature has so far provided 
interesting insights on a regional resource curse for a wide range of countries. Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh (2007), for example, verified that resource-rich US states lagged behind in 
long-term growth (as a result of reduced investment, lower educational attainments and 
trade openness and higher corruption; James and Aadland (2011) find similar evidence 
at the more disaggregated county level). Zhang et al. (2008) find similar differences in 
consumption per capita growth across Chinese provinces that partly explain the 
disparities in living standards observed between coastal and inland regions (see also 
Shao and Qi, 2009, for a similar analysis on income per capita growth). Yuxiang and 
Chen (2011) further showed that mineral rich regions in China suffer from a slower 
pace of financial development. Papyrakis and Raveh (2014) examined the Dutch 
Disease at the regional level across Canadian provinces and found that mineral-rich 
provinces suffer from inflationary pressures and reduced competitiveness. Angrist and 
Kugler (2008) find that dependence on coca production and associated rent-seeking 
explains differences in the extent of civil conflict across Colombian regions. Within-
region income inequality can also be associated with regional oil and gas abundance 
(see the empirical analysis across Russian regions by Buccellato and Mickiewitz, 
2009). Deaton and Niman (2012) make use of county data from the Appalachian region 
to show how mineral dependence increases poverty rates in the longer term (although 
it tends to have the opposite effect in the short term).  
Differences between resource rich and resource scarce regions can also extend 
to the institutional dimension. Subnational studies have shown that oil rents assist 
elected officials to prolong their stay in power through generous redistribution 
(irrespective of the quality of the services they provide; see Goldberg et al., 2008, for 
the US and Gervasoni, 2010a, 2010b for Argentina). This is in line with Paler (2013) 
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who uses experimental data from 1,863 villagers (from the Blora district in Indonesia) 
to show how resource windfalls reduce public pressure in terms of holding politicians 
accountable for their actions. Libman (2013) finds that mineral rents encourage 
economic growth in Russian regions with efficient and transparent bureaucracies 
(although not necessarily with democratic political systems). Similarly, subnational 
data from Peru show how bureaucratic capacity can reduce rent-seeking and prevent 
localised social conflict in mineral-rich areas (Ponce and McClintock, 2014). Vicente 
(2010) provides evidence of a subnational causal link between perceived corruption and 
oil discovery using household data from São Tomé and Príncipe. 
 
5. THE MICRO SCALE  
In parallel, although quite independently and often quite covertly (i.e. more 
often under the banner of ‘development’, see Weszkalnys, 2010), a separate substream 
of the resource curse literature, dominated by anthropologists but also including other 
social scientists, has probed into the development impacts of the extractive industries 
at the micro or community level. This micro resource curse literature, as a result of the 
scholarly prevalence by non-economists, has examined more closely the broader 
development outcomes and impacts of extractive industries on individual agency and 
community relationships, as well as the cultural characteristics that drive action and 
determine outcomes. These studies examine how and why processes of resource 
extraction provoke certain kinds of reaction. For example, why is poverty exacerbated 
in mineral contexts (e.g. Hilson, 2010, 2012)? How does mineral wealth stimulate 
gender inequalities and social fragmentation (e.g. Macintyre, 2003)? How do specific 
social worlds determine response and action (Banks, 2008)? 
There is general agreement within the micro level literature that the very basic 
level of cultural difference (based on conflicting and incompatible social, political and 
economic forms of organisation) creates very basic human problems – conflict, social 
fragmentation and dislocation, poverty and inequality. Indigenous (or ‘non-Western’) 
populations with non-market, transitional or recently hybridized economic systems of 
organization accommodate the peculiarities associated with mineral extraction in line 
with their own social, economic and political idioms. Anthropologists, for example, 
have argued that market transactions are, by their very nature, incompatible with locally 
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embedded systems dominated by principles of delayed reciprocity and obligation (e.g. 
Filer, 1990, 1998; Biersack, 1999; Crook, 2007; Golub, 2007; Bainton, 2008).  
Unfamiliarity combined with incompatibility can lead to a lack of engagement 
with the market structures that ultimately engender economic growth, and are thus 
likely to constrain the ability of local communities to transform their proximity to 
mineral extraction into a ‘blessing’. The difference in the organizational character 
between a market (mineral-driven) economy and a subsistence/transitional (rural-
based) one can be crucial to understanding how the activities associated with mineral 
extraction do or do not benefit local communities on the one hand, and are interpreted 
and acted on by them on the other.  
At the heart of the conflict are the principles guiding exchange and connectivity 
to place and kin that ensures social and economic security for all (Gilberthorpe and 
Sillitoe, 2009; Kirsch, 2009), and the imposed capitalist principles that are 
individualizing, solitary and dependent on colonial principles of state ownership and a 
hierarchical structure modeled on principles of core and periphery. This opposition can 
generate tensions between the state/corporate sector and indigenous communities, and 
can lead to violent and non-violent conflict (see examples in Watts, 2008; Behrends et 
al., 2011; Thorp et al., 2012). On the flip side of this is the opportunities mineral wealth 
can provide and the social relationships that develop as a result of mine occupation. 
Golub’s 2014 exploration of gold mining in Papua New Guinea, for example, 
chronicles in rich ethnographic detail the individual relationships that evolve out of 
local/mine negotiations and the problems that emerge as a result. Golub’s work 
highlights the political processes entwined in resource extraction at the local level and, 
in so doing, underlines the forces of inequality, social dislocation and conflict that can 
form the basis of a resource curse (see also Watts, 2001; Banks, 2008; Arellano-
Yanguas, 2011).   
Like Golub, other anthropologists have examined the emerging political issues 
accelerated by extractive industries, in particular social movements and concepts of 
indigeneity, how these become politicised and what that means for social 
fragmentation. Suzanne Sawyer’s book (2004), for example, chronicles the emergence 
of indigenous movements in Ecuador in a stand against multinational oil companies 
and the Ecuadorian state (see also Bebbington et al., 2010). Sawyer and others 
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(Carneiro da Cunha, 2009; Warnaars and Bebbington, 2014) demonstrate the growing 
relevance of indigeneity in political discourse around national belonging and ownership 
of land and resources in extractive industry contexts. In Latin America in particular, 
indigenous groups are taking the process of resource-based development into their own 
hands and making demands that fit their own (dynamic) cultural condition.  
It is perhaps the covert association in the anthropological literature with ‘the 
resource curse’ proper (due to its roots in economic theory and a greater disciplinary 
concern with processes of social change) that separates it theoretically from the macro 
and meso level studies discussed above. Yet many of these studies could make vital 
contributions to adapting the assumptions currently embedded in mineral policy (such 
as the assumption that infrastructure and cash are vehicles for development and 
conduits of ‘self-development’). The complexities and dynamics of social organization 
and interaction at all levels contribute to the resource curse; be this in a so-called 
‘developing’ country, such as Papua New Guinea (e.g. Golub, 2014; Gilberthorpe, 
2007) or in what are more often termed ‘developed states’ (see for example Trigger 
1997, and Langton and Mazel 2008 for Australia; Gilberthorpe et al., 2014 for Qatar). 
Regardless of scale, nuanced sociocultural factors of kinship, descent and exchange 
have a critical influence on local responses to mineral-based development, but still 
remain absent from policy planning (Banks, 2008; Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012).  
One particular area where micro level researchers have been vocal, is in their 
critiques of extractive industries. Some have argued that corporate rhetoric  of 
‘sustainability’ (e.g. ‘sustainable mining’) and discourses associated with ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ have been employed by the extractive industries to legitimize 
activity, mitigate local concern for bad practice, appease local hostilities, and ultimately 
facilitate production in the midst of environmental devastation and social disruption. 
Anthropologists Benson and Kirsch, for example, argue that a rhetoric of 
‘sustainability’ is employed to benefit the corporate sector over and above local 
communities (Benson and Kirsch, 2010; also Kirsch, 2010; Gilberthorpe and Banks, 
2012; O’Faircheallaigh and Ali, 2008). In a similar vein Rajak (2012) examines 
‘corporate virtue’ (under the banner of corporate social responsibility) as a condition of 
late capitalism to show how the merger between corporate (extractive) activity and 
development (especially social development) reproduces a culture of dependency and 
power in which the indigenous ‘impacted communities’ remain powerless players on 
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the periphery of capitalist discourse and contemporary notions of market discipline 
(also Gilberthorpe, 2013). The critical view is perhaps best summed up by Weszkalnys, 
however, who sees the resource curse as “less the invention of economic theorists or a 
possible doomed future than a continuation of business-as-usual under slightly altered 
rules” (2011: 366). Insights such as these are vital components in our understanding of 
how (or whether) a resource curse exists in diverse social, economic and political 
contexts.  
 
6. FRAGMENTATION ALONG OTHER LINES  
It is not only the scale of the analysis and types of impacts/mechanisms 
considered that fragment the resource curse literature. Several other lines of 
fragmentation exist. Different research methodologies have been utilised to examine 
the resource curse depending on the disciplinary background of the researcher(s). While 
it is not surprising that different social scientists adopt a diverse range of 
methodological approaches, this naturally conditions the insights that can be gained. 
Many economists and several political scientists (especially those working at the macro 
level of the resource curse) apply cross-country regression analysis to examine the link 
between mineral resources and some development outcomes (e.g. economic growth, 
investment, institutional quality, conflict, etc), as well as identify other factors that 
mediate this relationship.  
The purpose of such a methodological approach is to identify general trends (i.e. 
rules of thumb) and broad differences between mineral rich and scarce nations. Quite 
often this type of empirical work aims at testing some predefined theory (e.g. a Dutch 
Disease, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, a growth theoretical model, a rent-seeking 
conceptual argument, etc.). Several papers even develop their own theoretical 
frameworks and then subsequently test them (e.g. see Mehlum et al., 2006b; Olsson, 
2007). On the other hand, anthropologists and some other social scientists typically 
carry out qualitative research that does not necessarily aim at testing theories and their 
general applicability. The focus instead is on an in-depth understanding of particular 
cases (or comparison of few of them) – this allows them to extract more detailed case-
specific information on the development effects of the extractive industries without 
necessarily striving for a generalisation of the insights gained (see Golub, 2014; Rajak, 
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2012). Naturally, both approaches have merits and should complement each other – in 
many cases this is unfortunately not the case. For example, micro-qualitative evidence 
should ideally be compared to the more macro-quantitative evidence with an 
accompanied critical reflection in case of a deviation in findings between the two 
approaches.  
This methodological fragmentation is to a large extent explained by how (and 
when) different disciplines engaged with the ‘resource curse’ paradox and its 
repercussions. Since the seminal work by Gelb and his associates (1988) and Auty 
(1993), the initial research/policy question that predominantly attracted attention was 
the reasons behind the poor economic performance of mineral-rich countries and the 
ill-shaped macroeconomic programmes chosen by their policy-makers and 
governments. Naturally, it was the more macro-level economists, political economy 
specialists and political scientists that primarily engaged with this question and its 
variants. As a result, the initial methodology employed to examine the macro-
perspective of the resource curse was largely monopolised by the methodological tools 
typically used by economics, political economy and political science (i.e. cross-country 
regression analysis, country comparisons, governance political-economy theories, etc.). 
This type of analysis also appeals more to stakeholders (with an interest in the macro-
perspective of the resource curse), since it allows for broader generalisation (and 
applicability of findings) and often an easier interpretation, without the complex 
specificities that an ethnographic/anthropological perspective of a community-based 
resource curse analysis would entail. Hence, the initial policy and research focus of the 
‘resource curse’ on macro-level development impacts and responses also created (at 
least at the beginning) less enthusiasm from other micro-level scholars (often 
anthropologists and sociologists, but also micro-development economists) to engage 
with the question at the more micro/community level. Gradually (as it often happens 
with any nascent research literature) new research concerns arose that related more 
closely to the micro-impacts of mineral-based development on local communities and 
their interaction with the state and the extractive sector. This was a natural evolution of 
thinking, with scholars with a more micro focus realising that extractive projects do not 
only influence the macro-economy but also produce more localised 
(social/environmental) effects that directly impact on local communities and their 
livelihoods. 
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As evident from the earlier discussion in this chapter, the resource curse 
literature has been fragmented with respect to the dependent variables it aims to explain 
(e.g. variation in economic growth, institutions, democracy, trade, conflict, educational 
attainments, health standards, etc.). An aspect that often, though, receives less attention 
is the choice of the independent variable that is meant to capture resource richness or 
wealth. Since the seminal work by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), it is customary to 
distinguish between ‘resource dependence’ vs. ‘resource abundance’ indices, with the 
former measuring the value of natural resources as a share of economic activity (e.g. 
GDP, exports, etc.) and the latter in terms of population (or land; i.e. a rather exogenous 
variable less likely to be influenced by natural resources should appear at the 
denominator). Studies often found that the resource curse evidence disappears when 
one uses indices of resource value in per capita (land) terms rather than as a share of 
overall economic activity (e.g. see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Cavalcanti et al., 
2011; Stijns, 2005, 2006). 
There is also much variation in terms of the type of natural resources 
considered. The resource curse literature typically distinguishes between point and 
diffuse resources – the former relate to natural resources that are usually geographically 
concentrated and expropriated by a smaller share of the population (as in the case of 
mineral resources), while the latter relate to resources that are more widely dispersed 
(as in the case of agriculture). Most scholars nowadays agree that it is typically the 
extractive industries (rather than the diffuse resources) that contribute to resource curse 
types of phenomena (Bulte et al., 2005; Isham et al., 2005; Lederman and Maloney, 
2007) – although there is also some evidence of a more localised non-mineral resource 
curse, as in the case of cocoa leaf production in Colombia (Angrist and Kugler 2008). 
Earlier studies often failed to look separately at the differentiated effects of the two 
types of resources (e.g. see Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997; Gylfason et al., 1999; 
Kronenberg, 2004). 
   
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS: A NEED FOR A MULTI-SCALE APPROACH  
In this paper we have attempted to exemplify the fragmentation of research on 
the resource curse across disciplinary lines and across different levels of scale. The 
macro and meso resource curse literature that focuses on cross-country and cross-
regional comparisons is largely dominated by the work of macroeconomists, political 
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economists and political scientists. On the other hand, the micro resource curse 
literature that examines the links between mineral extraction and development at the 
local level mainly comprises of the work of anthropologists and other social scientists. 
Multiple reasons justify the need for a unified framework of analysis that 
bridges different scales. The macro resource curse evidence (e.g. in the form of reduced 
economic growth as a result of the distortionary impacts of a mineral boom) suggests 
that, on average, individuals in a mineral-rich country receive less income over time. 
The micro perspective is required in order to grasp how this macro resource curse 
burden is distributed (for example, due to elitism, social disintegration, and corruption). 
If the resource curse holds both at the more macro as well as micro level, this would 
suggest that local communities in mineral rich areas will be disproportionately more 
affected. They are likely to suffer both as a result of the more general poor 
macroeconomic performance, as well as the more localised adverse effects, e.g. in the 
form of erosion of social capital or environmental degradation. Naturally, while the 
economy might suffer as a whole, and local indigenous communities may suffer the 
most, it might not necessarily be the case that everyone in the economy suffers. If 
mineral revenues (e.g. directly or indirectly via redistribution through the public 
budget) primarily benefit local urban elites, one needs to design policies that 
redistribute financial resources to the local communities in the mining areas and to 
understanding how those resources will be integrated and interpreted. Obviously, this 
is not always easy to implement given the intrinsic interests and resistance of the urban 
elites to alter the status quo. Perhaps a solution (that could become more 
institutionalised) would be for environmental and social impact assessments to become 
a standard norm and also incorporate an analysis on the social dimensions of impacts 
to local communities (see Banks, 2013). It is not the aim of this paper to devise solutions 
to an issue of such complexity, but rather explicate the necessity to simultaneously 
approach the resource curse within a country from multiple scales. 
 Keeping sight of the meso scale is also equally important. Mineral resources are 
often geographically concentrated and have the potential to trigger frictions or even 
civil conflict particularly for countries that are largely ethnically or religiously 
fragmented. A meso resource curse, where mineral rich provinces/regions are more 
adversely affected by the resource curse in comparison with their mineral scarce 
counterparts (as a result of regional resource curse impacts, e.g. in the form of 
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intensified rent-seeking or a regional Dutch Disease), is likely to create a sense of 
injustice that could transform in the long run into political discord, violent conflict and 
even economic contraction for the whole country (in other words, a meso resource curse 
can set the foundations for a more macro resource curse). At the more micro level, 
communities in mineral rich regions are likely to be affected more, given their 
proximity to the contestable resources.  
There is an additional reason justifying the need for a more holistic cross-scale 
framework of analysis. The scale of fragmentation of research on the resource curse 
largely overlaps with a disciplinary bias. The macro and meso resource curse is mainly 
dominated by economists and political scientists, while the micro resource curse 
literature mainly comprises of the work of other social scientists, often with a large 
anthropological focus. As a result, the more macro-scale approach has focused more on 
economic impacts (e.g. in terms of changes in income per capita) and the macro 
institutional environment, while the more micro-scale work has looked at broader 
development outcomes that are often difficult to quantify in a standardised numerical 
manner (e.g. effects on community trust and social cohesion). The insights from all 
these different disciplinary approaches are naturally invaluable to understanding how 
the resource curse might (or might not) materialise at different levels, as well as how it 
might spill across scales. In short, there is a need to approach the resource curse from a 
more collaborative interdisciplinary angle, which will permit the defragmentation of 
the literature both across scale and disciplinary lines and foster the development of more 
socially aware mineral policy that shows commitment to sound macroeconomic 
performance as well as the safeguarding of social and cultural capital at the more local 
level.  
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